Archive for the ‘Mediation & Negotiation’ Category
Back in 2012, we wrote about which gender was the more moral in negotiations. (Spoiler alert: it was women.) Now we have a new article on why women get lied to in negotiations. Not when or if–but why. Basically, people believe women are more easily misled than men and people believe women to be less competent than men. Therefore, “negotiators deceived women more so than men, thus leading women into more deals under false pretenses than men”. The researchers completed three separate studies and (to add insult to injury) these were not experiments using the ubiquitous undergraduate. These research participants were adults in the working world.
In Study 1, 131 employees (75 male and 56 female) at an online marketing research website participated in the research. (Gender was the only demographic information collected so we don’t know their educational backgrounds, average age or racial identity.) Participants were asked to imagine they were selling a used car and posted an ad on a community website. They were then approached by a male (or female) buyer. The participants were told that the buyer appeared to be a typical (male or female) negotiator. They were then asked to rate the imagined buyer on eight different traits: warmth, kindness, business sense, ambition, gullible, naïve, arrogance or stubborn. The researchers added four additional traits: easily misled, impulsive, confident and knowledgeable.
Women were perceived as both less competent and more easily misled in negotiations than were men. (These variables were derived using multiple traits rated by participants: Ease of being misled = Easily misled + Gullible + Naïve + Impulsive; and Competence = Good business sense + Confident + Knowledgeable + Ambitious.)
In Study 2, 394 employees (116 female, average age 32 years, 74% White, 7% Black, 5% Hispanic, 11% Asian, 1% Native American and 2% ‘other’) at Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in the research. These participants were asked to imagine someone (the Seller) was selling an antique chair said to be worth $1,250 according to a popular buying guide. However, one of the legs was broken and would cost $250 to repair correctly. Instead, the Seller fixed it temporarily knowing it would become wobbly again with use. The only way the Buyer would know the chair was defective is if the information was disclosed by the Seller. Again, a male and female buyer approached the Seller.
Again, women were perceived as more easily misled and as less competent. Women were believed to be less able to detect deception on the part of the Seller.
Undaunted, the researchers continued on to Study 3. This time the participants were 298 full-time MBA students (221 of whom were male) enrolled in a negotiations course. They were paired into 149 dyads (65 male-male, 23 female buyer-male seller, 48 male buyer-female seller, and 13 female-female). Research participants completed the “Bullard Houses” role-playing exercise which basically simulates a real estate transaction. They were randomly assigned to negotiate as the buyer’s agent or the seller’s agent. The buyers’ agents could either tell the truth, misrepresent, or tell an outright lie about their intentions in order to lure the sellers’ agents into a deal. And you will never see this finding coming.
Female negotiators were deceived more than male negotiators.
The researchers say that women at the negotiating table are going to be offered less favorable deal terms (based on past research) and they are going to be lied to more often than men. As the researchers looked more closely at the ways in which women were deceived, they found that women were told more blatant lies than were men and men tended to be told the truth. The researchers summarize their findings this way:
“The gender bias in deception appears driven by a greater propensity to tell women blatant lies in a situation in which men tend to be told the truth.”
This study is disheartening for any number of reasons, and it raises questions about how universal this general pattern is. From a litigation advocacy perspective, this series of studies tends to indicate women may simply be lied to rather than being allowed to engage in actual negotiations about case issues. Are they more subject to men failing to properly disclose in discovery? More often victims of spoliation of evidence? Dirty tricks at trial?
The researchers wonder if their findings could help explain the gender gap at high levels in business organizations. Women, say the researchers, may shy away from negotiations since they will be lied to and thus be at increased risk of entering into deals on the basis of false pretenses. While okay as a hypothesis worthy of testing, it is not at all supported by evidence. Let’s see an experimental design that looks at “what do women do when they know that they are being lied to by men?”. And, let’s be clear– it is more than ironic (“sexist” comes to mind) to think of this in terms of women somehow being less effective because of their weariness over men lying to them. Aren’t we talking here about being lied to? By men? We would say that until the social stereotype that women are easy to mislead is changed, and men stop lying in ways that are less likely when dealing with other men, awareness will do little to change the outcomes of their negotiations, mediations, and settlement talks.
Kray, LJ, Kennedy, JA, & Van Zant, AB (2014). Not competent enough to know the difference? Gender stereotypes about women’s ease of being misled predict negotiator deception. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.
We’ve written before about salary negotiations in general, the difference in what men and women are paid, and salary negotiations for women only. So here’s another new study that says, whether you are male or female, going in with a specific number (like $5,015 rather than $5,000) gives you an edge in negotiations.
Researchers examined the use of round numbers in negotiations (in both the classroom and on Zillow–a real estate website). They found round numbers were much more often the initial offer on the table. For example, when looking at Zillow in four American cities, 73% of homes in the $10K to $99.9K range and 71% of homes in the $100K to $999K range “ended with at least three trailing zeros”. 98% of homes in the $1M to $10M range had listing prices that contained at “least three trailing zeros”.
So, the researchers wondered what would happen if you gave a more precise number rather than one with multiple zeros at the end. After multiple experiments, the researchers concluded that precise initial offers (that is, specific numbers not ended with trailing zeros) acted as “more potent anchors” than did round numbers (with trailing zeros). Round numbers have appeal, say the researchers, because they are easier to remember, fairly noncommittal, and “imprecision is a form of prudence”. (We are not sure exactly what that means but it’s an evocative phrase.)
The researchers believe that when you lead with a precise number, in any sort of negotiation, you send the message that you are prepared, informed, and knowledgeable about the value of either the item for which you are offering money or for salaries in your field. This precise offer leads the recipient of your opening bid to offer a returning number that is higher (when negotiating salaries or bartering on CraigsList items) than you might get if you offer a round initial request.
It’s an interesting piece of work, with applications to salary, mediation offers, jury charge “asks”, auto purchases, and even bartering at the farmer’s market. The researchers recommend bumping a $50 item to $49.75 (if you are the seller) or offering $50.25 if you are the buyer. They also comment that the research “highlight[s] how a lack of awareness about the power of precision may put the recipient of a precise offer at a disadvantage”. It’s intriguing research to experiment with in your day-to-day life–whether for mediation or that nice bunch of carrots next to the bright red radishes.
Mason, MF, Lee, AJ, Wiley, EA, & Ames, DR (2013). Precise offers are potent anchors: Conciliatory counter-offers and attributions of knowledge in negotiations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 759-763
Parties in negotiation are often eager to gain an edge in the maneuvering. Plans sometimes are made to walk away in anger as a strategy to elicit cooperation from the other side. But is that a good idea? Researchers say faking anger is not a wise move, but expressing actually felt anger may help you in negotiations.
Why? Because if your emotion is seen as inauthentic it generates distrust. The researchers describe faking anger as “surface acting”. Surface acting is what you do when you express a feeling externally that is not the same as what you feel on the inside. According to the cited prior research, how your face looks when you “pretend” anger, is quite different from how it looks when you actually feel anger. And the other person knows and may interpret your display as “inauthentic, calculated, dishonest, and opportunistic”. On the other hand, authentic anger can make the opposition see you as “tough and unlikely to compromise” and thus, paradoxically, makes them engage. (To help the actors used in this research display “authentic anger”, they were told to remember an incident that had truly made them angry and then record the experimental script.)
The researchers looked at the impact of “surface acted anger” versus actual anger (communicated by actors using a “deep acting” strategy!) in a negotiation process. Participants were 140 university students (66 men and 74 women) between the ages of 18 and 28. They were randomly assigned to view a videotaped recording of a male negotiating a car sale with them. The person making the offer for the car described what they wanted and then, what they had concerns about with the vehicle.
There were three forms of the videotaped car purchase offer: either a faked angry presentation, a neutral presentation, or an angry presentation. They were to view the recording, decide whether to accept or reject the offer–and if they rejected the offer, to make a counter-offer. The researchers set the initial financial offer for the car at the low end of the car’s value so that a large proportion of the students would counter-offer.
And here is what the researchers found:
When you fake anger in a negotiation process, the other side is likely to “place particularly high demands on you, be relatively dissatisfied, and have little interest in working with you again” because of distrust.
The highest counter-offers were made to negotiators who faked anger, then negotiators who maintained a more neutral (aka “composed”) facade. The lowest counter-offers were made to those exhibiting a “deep acting” anger.
According to the research participants, there was no difference in what they saw as the intensity of the anger between those negotiators showing fake anger and those showing more authentic anger–they saw them as equally intense. However, they distrusted the fake angry negotiator and placed higher demands and saw the more authentically angry negotiator as tough and placed lower demands.
The researchers conclude that fake anger results in the least favorable demands from negotiation partners. Conversely, more attractive demands are made when you maintain more neutrality and the most attractive are made when you exhibit genuine anger. However–and this is the dilemma in social sciences research–these actors were not exhibiting genuine anger. They were acting and using past experiences of anger to guide their emotional expression. Even good actors display “anger” differently than you or I are likely to.
So we aren’t sure what this means for you in mediation/negotiation. Clearly, we don’t recommend you fake anger. Probably, the best bet is for you to maintain composure and emotional neutrality and take the medium counter-offer rather than the high or the low. Or if all else fails, try being genuine, whatever that might mean. If you want to settle, that is.
Côté, S., Hideg, I., & van Kleef, G. (2013). The consequences of faking anger in negotiations Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49 (3), 453-463 DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2012.12.015
We’ve seen a lot of articles on the value of apology for victims (and we’ve written a number of them here) but there isn’t much out there on the value of the apology for the perpetrator of the wrong-doing. Victims tend to want apologies when they believe harm done was intentional. Victims, in this instance, often feel angry. Perpetrators, on the other hand, often especially want to offer an apology when the transgression was not intentional. Perpetrators, in this instance, often feel guilty for having harmed another.
European researchers believed these differing emotions (e.g., anger and guilt) can result in an “apology mismatch” and thus have impact on future forgiveness and reconciliation between the victim and the perpetrator. After three different experiments, the researchers reported that:
Apologies are driven by the perpetrator’s needs and they do not often consider the needs of the victim.
Perpetrator’s are more likely to apologize after unintentional transgressions due to higher levels of guilt.
Victims are not as angry after unintentional transgressions and therefore they are more likely to forgive the perpetrator.
Intentional transgressions result in the highest desire for apology from the angry victim and the lowest level of desire to apologize from the unrepentant perpetrator. A lack of apology can intensify the victim’s anger.
Ironically, the researchers cite prior research showing that when the angry victim receives the apology they say they want from the perpetrator of the intentional transgression–it doesn’t help as much as the victim anticipated it would.
Perpetrators may end up feeling guilt and thus apologizing for intentional transgressions that had unintended consequences such as pushing a friend into a pool and ruining a new smart phone in the friend’s pocket.
Overall, the researchers say, the desire for an apology and the desire to apologize are often mismatched and can result in grave difficulty reaching compromise. Those charged with mediating/negotiating solutions to such situations often find them more difficult than initially expected.
Our mock jurors often express distress in these situations. They wonder why the parties didn’t “work it out before it went so far”. When disputes involve conflict between family members, they always want the family members to drop lawsuits and go to counseling or just work out their disagreements and remember to love each other. Jurors don’t like conflict and tension any more than the rest of us do. They want to believe an apology can make all the difference in the world. The reality can be much more complex than any of us might imagine.
Consider also the import of this for mediation. Thinking in terms of the intangible/non-economic factors that facilitate resolution, this research is significant. The Plaintiff may be convinced that the wrong was done intentionally. The Defendant may feel that the damage that gave rise to the lawsuit was inadvertent, but may also feel angry or bitter that their error has been blown into a character attack. Strategies for diffusing the tension and bridging the misaligned perceptions end up feeling more like family therapy than law, but it is the very human nature of the process. What we have found can help is a mediation strategy (reinforced by the respective advocates of the parties) that:
You are justified in feeling wounded.
There are two issues at work: The compensable injury (the suit) and the personal affront (the emotional barrier to resolution).
The parties may never see eye-to-eye.
But even with the differences in perspective, both sides regret the situation, and also regret the related misunderstanding. Saying something like “I can’t honestly say that I see it the way you do, but I’m genuinely sorry that you are upset. I didn’t mean for any of this to happen” can often loosen deadlocks.
Leunissen, J., De Cremer, D., Reinders Folmer, C., & van Dijke, M. (2013). The apology mismatch: Asymmetries between victim’s need for apologies and perpetrator’s willingness to apologize Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49 (3), 315-324 DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2012.12.005