On brains, brain damage, pedophilia and other things we don’t like
Gideon has a thoughtful post on the question of free will in pedophiles based on an earlier post at the Neuroskeptic blog. In essence, he questions how we should view/think of/treat pedophiles in our criminal justice system if there are times when sexual urges directed at children are caused by brain damage rather than a pre-existing sexual preference for children. Can pedophilia be explained by a biological imperitive? It’s a thoughtful and difficult question to pose, as Gideon notes at the end of his post by saying he is not supporting pedophilia—he is merely posing the question.
The question is timely. We are seeing increasing use of “my brain made me do it” defenses for crimes with NoLie MRI and Cephos offering commercial testing using fMRIs to determine deception for several years now. (NoLie MRI was involved in a widely reported case this last year where their brain scans were submitted as evidence in a juvenile sex abuse case but then withdrawn after protests from the scientific community.)
Robert Weisberg (co-director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center) says fMRI’s are increasingly being used as mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase to show that brain damage contributed to the behavior and makes the defendant less culpable. For example, a Chicago court recently allowed fMRI evidence to be presented by the defense to ‘prove’ the convicted defendant was psychopathic in the sentencing phase. The defendant was sentenced to death anyway. Perhaps the most shocking use of the fMRI occurred recently in India where a young woman involved in a romantic triangle was convicted of killing her ex-fiancee based on an fMRI scan that “purportedly showed she had a memory or “experiential knowledge” of committing the crime”.
The admissibility of these brain scans to ‘prove’ deception (or psychopathy, or even memories of committing murder) rests on individual judges, and skeptics abound including leading researchers in the neuroscience arena who simply say we do not yet know enough about what these results mean to make life and death decisions based on fMRI ‘evidence’. Even putting aside questions of whether the fMRI technology works (and the Stanford article provides a lot of good information on the question) how can you get past the natural (and understandable) negative reaction of jurors to behavior we find unconscionable? It seems most likely that jurors who are predisposed (by bias or other evidence) to agree with whatever the “scientific evidence” says will see it as confirmatory, and those who disagree with it will see it as junk science.
The reason that Daubert motions were endorsed in the first place was to avoid cluttering trials with junk science. Is this a step backward?